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Non-Technical Summary
In recent years stock option plans have become a substantial part
of compensation schemes in U.S. companies. While in the begin-
ning companies granted options only to the top-management more
and more companies oer broad-based stock option plans. For these
plans more than 50 percent of the employees are eligible. It is well
known that stock option plans are suitable to bring employees' in-
terests in line with shareholders' interests, since due to these option
plans their income is linked to shareholders' wealth. But it is still an
open question why stock option programs are more popular than simi-
lar performance-based compensation schemes. This paper proposes an
answer: Because of the actual accounting rules in the USA, compa-
nies are able to hide the labor-cost resulting from stock option plans.
More precisely, the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(US-GAAP) require no charge to earnings for specically designed
stock option plans if a company opts for footnote disclosure. Thus,
using such stock option plans companies' earnings are higher than
with similar performance-based compensation schemes, even though
economically they are the same. Based on a case study of 20 compa-
nies out of the SP 500 which rely heavily on employee stock options
we arrive at the conclusion that the amount of hidden compensation
cost can reach economically signicant amounts. Hence, this hidden
labor-cost component should not be neglected either by academic nor
by applied investment research, since the analysis of a rm's earnings
power may be considerably biased. But, this topic seems to be widely
neglected and thus it is questionable whether stock prices reect these
hidden cost and whether academic research results are partly driven
by this misrepresentation of earnings.
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Several studies indicate that stock option plans are becoming more and
more a substantial part of compensation schemes in U.S. companies. This
paper shows the tax implications and accounting rules for stock option plans.
By comparison of the tax and accounting rules for dierent compensation
schemes we show that the popularity of stock options may be mainly due to
the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) which require
no charge to earnings for specically designed stock option plans if a company
opts for footnote disclosure. Thus, for these companies the stated earnings are
higher than their economical situations justify. Based on a case study of 20
companies out of the S&P 500 which rely heavily on employee stock options
we arrive at the conclusion that the amount of hidden compensation cost can
reach economically signicant amounts. Since this topic seems to be widely
neglected it is questionable whether stock prices reect these hidden cost.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, stock options were awarded exclusively to top-
management in order to link their interests with those of shareholders.
More recently, companies have begun to provide stock option plans
also for "key" employees. According to the National Center for Em-
ployee Ownership (NCEO) "more and more companies consider all
of their employees as 'key'" and oer broad-based stock option plans,
i.e. plans for which more than 50 percent of employees are eligible. The
NCEO estimates that seven to ten million employees receive stock op-
tions as of May 2000, up from around 1 million in 1991. Moreover, the
number of options granted has reached considerable amounts in the
meantime. For example, a recent Federal Reserve Board (FED) study
shows that average annual stock option grants of the S&P 500 com-
panies exceeded one percent of outstanding shares during the period
1994 to 1998 (see Liang and Sharpe 1999).
1
Several studies show that
stock options are the most popular instrument to attract and retain
highly specialized personal { at a time when companies in the U.S.
1
Note that this number varies considerably among individual companies. Moreover, Liang and
Sharpe (1999) nd that companies already spend around 40% of their cash ow in order to buy
back shares. Their study is based on 150 of the largest domestic S&P 500 companies. See also
Callies and Sareen (2000).
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are confronted with the tightest labor market in more than a decade.
2
Economically speaking, stock option plans are just another wage com-
ponent given as a substitute for cash payments. Why are stock option
plans so attractive? What makes them preferable to cash incentives?
This paper suggests that the main reason can be found in the U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP). They require
cash payments to be recognized as compensation cost while fringe
benets in the form of specically designed stock option plans may go
unrecognized. However, if a part of the cost is omitted earnings are
overstated. Therefore, this paper compares income as stated with in-
come on the basis of total compensation cost accrual. Looking at some
companies which use stock option plans extensively, we ask whether
the misrepresentation of earnings by "income as stated" can reach
economically signicant amounts.
Arriving at the conclusion that employee stock options are valu-
able and represent compensation the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) "encourages" all entities in its Statement No. 123
(FAS 123) to measure the cost by the "fair value method". Com-
panies should measure compensation cost at the grant date using an
option pricing model such as Black-Scholes and recognize this cost
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See, for example, NCEO (1999).
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ratably over the service period. Nevertheless, FAS 123 allows compa-
nies to continue recognizing compensation cost by the "intrinsic value
method" of Accounting Principal Board Opinion No. 25 (APB 25).
Since exercise prices are usually chosen at the current stock price or
slightly above, the intrinsic value is zero and, thus, no compensation
cost at all has to be recognized under this method and the bottom
line, i.e. "net income as stated", is not aected.
However, additional disclosures are required if a company elects to fol-
low ABP 25. It has to disclose a "pro forma net income" based on the
fair value method in the notes of annual statements. In capital mar-
kets that process information eciently one would expect that these
FAS 123 complient pro forma income gures capture the headlines
anyway. On the contrary, what you see frequently is pro forma income
adjusted for one-time charges such as merger related costs or invest-
ment income. Pro forma gures that account for compensation cost of
option plans rarely show up at all in the nancial press. For example,
I/B/E/S
3
forecasts are based on income from continuing operations.
No adjustment is made for omitted compensation cost.
4
While pro
forma gures reecting compensation cost of option plans have to be
disclosed within the notes of annual reports (e.g. 10-K forms) such a
3
I/B/E/S International Inc. is a global nancial information services company.
4
See e.g. I/B/E/S (1999).
3
disclosure is not required for quarterly reports (10-Q forms). More-
over, reported earnings per share gures or price earnings ratios are
almost always based on (operating) net income as stated rather than
on pro forma net income according to FAS 123.
One rationale for the existence of stock option plans is provided by
agency theory which shows that convex payout functions are suitable
to bring managers' interests in line with shareholders' interests. While
agency theory focuses largely on executive compensation, the same
arguments should apply to a wide range of nonmanagement employees,
especially those who are key to a company's success. However, in an
agency framework no distinction would be made between a cash bonus
plan and a stock option plan if both instruments provide identical
payouts .Stock appreciation rights may serve as an good example since
they oer the same convex payout structure as stock options but they
are paid in cash. From an agency theory point of view it makes no sense
to hide performance-based wage components from income statements
by following APB 25 as long as investors are able to infer compensation
cost associated with option grants from pro forma disclosures.
In order to evaluate the impact of options on stated earnings some
studies have looked at the gains managers as well as ordinary employ-
ees have received recently from exercising their options. For example,
4
surveying 96 companies that grant options to more than half of their
employees, the NCEO nds that employees usually obtain between
12% and 20% of their regular salaries from exercising their options.
5
Looking at the S&P 500 companies, a recent study by UBS Warbug
nds that for more than one fth of the S&P 500 companies the ratio
of total outstanding stock options to total outstanding shares exceeds
10%.
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As of June 30, 2000, the net exercise gain on all outstanding
options amounts to $570 billion, or 14.6% of total wages and salaries of
these companies. Looking at the 50 technology rms within the S&P
exercise gains on options granted by these companies alone accounts
for $330 billion.
Exercise gains may provide an explanation for the gap in the develop-
ment of the Department of Labor's data on wages and salaries and the
income tax data. However, exercise gains do not correctly reect the
compensation cost of options. Rather than giving options to its em-
ployees a company could sell those options provided there is a market.
This is exactly the amount a company should recognize as compensa-
tion cost over the service period. Since such a market does not exist,




See Carson (2000). These numbers include all stock options - whether they are fully vested or
not - given to nonmanagers as well as to managers.
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priate option pricing model as it is suggested by FAS 123. Whether
the buyers of these options make money or not is irrelevant for mea-
suring compensation cost. Relevant is the value of the options at the
time employees are promised to receive this "gift" if they stay with
the company.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briey describes
the properties of widely used stock option plans and asks whether
favorable tax or accounting rules may help to explain their popular-
ity. Companies reporting under US-GAAP may design employee stock
option plans such that net income as stated is not aected by the com-
pensation cost associated with these instruments. Some examples are
presented in section 3 in order to illustrate the calculation of hidden
compensation cost. Section 4 asks whether this cost component may
reach economically signicant amounts by investigating recent annual
reports of a sample of S&P 500 companies that use stock option com-
pensation extensively. Section 5 concludes.
2 Accounting and taxation of stock option plans
Various types of options may be granted under executive and non-
mangement employee stock option plans, but the most popular type
6
is a plain vanilla call option.
7
In order to qualify as an incentive stock
option under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) an option must be
exercisable within ten years of grant. Typically, options expire within
seven to ten years after grant.
8
Among other reasons, options are given
in order to retain an employee for a certain period. Therefore, it is re-
quired that she remains in the employment of the company until the
options get vested
9
. During this so-called service period she is not
able to exercise the options. Most of the companies install cli vest-
ing, i.e. all options vest after a xed period, typically three to ve
years. Other companies grant options which vest in certain install-
ments over the service period (graded vesting). For example, Yahoo!'s
options "generally vest 25% after the rst year of service and ratably
each month over the remaining thirty-six month period".
10
7
See NCEO (1999) for a study of nonmanagement plans. For an overview of nontraditional
types of executive stock options see e.g. Paulin (1992) or Johnson and Tian (2000).
8
See, for example, NCEO (1999) for nonmanagement stock option plans and Murphy (1996)
for executive plans.
9
An option gets vested if an employee has to render no additional service in order to earn
the right to benet from the option (FAS 123.27). Usually, an employee option is immediately
exercisable after it is vested.
10
See Yahoo!'s 1999 10-K form led with the SEC March 30, 2000. "As of December 31, 1999,
[Yahoo!] had fourteen stock-based compensation plans." The above cited rule applys to annual
option grants to employees of the company while "non-employee directors" receive a "First Option"
upon nomination which vests in equal monthly installments over four years and an "Annual Option"
which vests at the end of four years.
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2.1 Tax implications
In the following we describe briey tax eects of stock option plans
and we ask whether they may explain the popularity of these plans.
For tax purposes two types of stock option plans are distinguished,
incentive stock options (ISO) and non-qualied stock options (NSO).
An incentive stock option plan, which is also called a qualied or
statutory plan, receives special treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code. Rather than paying income tax at exercise, an employee pays
capital gains tax at the time the stock is sold. To receive this treat-
ment certain criteria have to be met: In particular, the stock may not
be sold within two years after grant and one year after exercise. Since
this is non-wage income the company does not have to withhold pay-
roll tax and no social security and medicare taxes are due. On the
other hand, the employer may not take a tax deduction. In a non-
qualied (or non-statutory) stock option plan there are no statutory
requirements to be met. Such an option would be taxed at grant if
it has a readily ascertainable fair market value (Code section 83 a).
Since these options usually are not tradeable, they are taxed at exer-
cise. The employee pays ordinary income tax on the spread between
the stock price at exercise and the option's exercise price. Both, em-
ployee and employer have to pay medicare taxes on this spread, and
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in addition, social security if the employee is not already above the
social security maximum. However, these amounts should be relatively
small. In contrast to an ISO, with an NSO the company gets a tax
deduction at the time the option is exercised. This deduction is equal
to the gain recognized by the employee. If the statutory requirement
of an ISO are not met, especially if the employee disposes of the stock
too early, a "disqualifying disposition" occurs and the tax implications
become similar to that of a NSO. While the exercise gain would still
be treated as non-wage income, the employer gets the tax deduction
on that gain.
The NCEO points out that an ISO might be preferable for some em-
ployees who want to take advantage of a lower marginal capital gains
tax rate compared to their income tax rate. Others simply lack the
cash to pay for the stock and therefore dispose of the stock right after
exercise. If the majority of employees engage in disqualifying disposi-
tions, the tax benet for the employer should be largely the same for
both types of plans. Then, there would be no major tax advantages
in favor of one of the plans and we would presume to see both plans
being implemented largely. In fact, 19 out of the 20 companies in our
study provide both, incentive and non-qualied stock option plans.
Basically, stock option plans substitute a part of wages otherwise paid
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in cash during the service period. This lowers costs and increases in-
come, and thus, more taxes have to be paid. If the plan is non-qualied,
the employer is allowed to deduct the exercise gain of his employee at
exercise, resulting in lower tax payments. For simplicity, assume a one-
year service period. Let S
0
denote the stock price at grant and X the
strike price of the option. Lowering his costs by the fair value of the
option at grant, C
0
, the tax burden of the employer increases by  C
0
in the rst period, where  denotes its eective tax rate. If the em-
ployee exercises the option in the next period, the employer gets a tax
benet of the dierence of the strike price C
0
and the stock price at
exercise, say S
T
, if this dierence is positive. Thus, its tax burden in
the second period decreases by  max(0; S
T
 X). Since this is exactly
 times the cash ow of an ordinary option, we may interpret a stock
option plan as follows: The employer "buys"  options from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service paying the fair value  C
0
at grant. At exercise, he
receives the payout of his tax option, i.e. a tax break in the amount of
 max(0; S
T
 X). Thus, if he has paid the fair value this is just a fair
game and he is not able to prot on the account of the IRS. Usually
the option price is not "paid" at grant but ratably over the service
period. This may allow the employer to realize a small interest gain.
On the other hand, if he grants incentive options and not all employees
10
engage in disqualifying dispositions he looses part of the nal payout.
Thus, tax advantages of stock option plans seem to be small at best.
Therefore, the next section analyzes whether accounting rules provide
a better explanation for the wide-spread use of stock options.
2.2 Accounting for stock option plans
Statement No. 123 "Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation" (FAS
123) was issued in October 1995 by the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board. It governs a variety of stock-based employee compensa-
tion plans including stock purchase plans
11
, stock options, restricted
stock, and stock appreciation rights. While FAS 123 encourages com-
panies to measure the cost of stock-based compensation by the "fair
value method", they are also permitted to continue recognizing com-
pensation cost by the "intrinsic value method" of the Accounting Prin-
cipal Board Opinion No. 25 "Accounting for Stock Issued to Employ-
ees" (APB 25).
APB 25 distinguishes between noncompensatory plans (APB 25.7)
and compensatory plans (APB 25.8{25.10). Basically, stock purchase
plans with reasonably small discounts (usually less than 5% of the
11
Stock purchase plans oer employees the possibility to buy stocks of the company at a price
which is lower than the actual market price
11
actual stock price) qualify as noncompensatory plans, stock option
plans go under the label compensatory plans. It is important to note
that even compensatory plans do not necessarily require to recognize
compensation cost (APB 25.10). Compensation is measured by the
intrinsic value of an instrument at the so-called measurement date.
For an option the intrinsic value is the amount by which the quoted
market price of the stock at the measurement date exceeds the strike
price. The measurement date varies with the type of option. According
to APB 25.10.b, this is the rst date for which both, the number of
shares and the exercise price are known. For a so-called xed plan
this is known at grant. So, if the exercise price is set equal to the
stock price at grant or higher (at- or out-of-the-money calls), then
no compensation cost at all has to be recognized. In contrast, for
plans with variable terms the measurement date can be considerably
later than the grant date. By then the option may have a positive
intrinsic value and thus require a recognition of compensation cost. A
performance-based plan in which the number of shares is contingent on
performance thresholds may serve as an example. The consideration,
if there is any, has to be recognized ratably over the service period,
i.e. between the grant date and the date the options get vested (APB
25.12).
12
If a company follows FAS 123, it would have to measure compensation
cost applying an appropriate option pricing model, "for example, the
Black-Scholes model or a binomial model" (FAS 123.19). The parame-
ters of the model have to be xed at grant date, especially the risk-free
rate, the expected dividend rate, and the expected volatility. Instead
of using the actual maturity of the option, it is recommended to use
the expected life, i.e. the estimated time until exercise (FAS 123.19,
see also appendix B of FAS 123). These estimates introduce some ar-
bitrariness into the recognition of compensation cost.
12
Nevertheless,
from a shareholder's point of view it is preferable that companies show
estimated fair option values rather than to recognize no compensation
cost at all.
According to FAS 123.26, compensation cost has to be based on the
expected number of options that vest. No compensation cost is re-
quired for options that are forfeited either because an employee leaves
the company or because a performance criterion is not met. However,
if an already vested option expires worthless previously recognized
compensation cost may not be reversed. Measured compensation cost
12
Investigating disclosures of executive stock option values in proxy statements, Yermack (1998)
nds that companies tend to exploit the exibility of regulations. For example, they shorten the
expected lives of options and thus try to reduce the apparent value of manager compensation.
Yermack suspects that companies might also try to curb displayed employee compensation.
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has to be recognized ratably over the service period (FAS 123.27-30).
For stock option plans with cli vesting the same amount has to be
recognized for each year. Using a graded vesting schedule, compensa-
tion cost is calculated as if a series of cli vesting awards was given
rather than a single award (FAS 123.31 and FASB Interpretation 28).
Thus, graded vesting implies that a higher cost gure is reported in
earlier years than in later years.
Regardless whether APB 25 or FAS 123 is applied, entities have to
include certain disclosures about stock options in their annual nan-
cial statements for scal years beginning after December 15, 1995 (FAS
123.45, 123.51). In particular, the number of options granted, the "fair
value" of these options, and the assumptions underlying the compu-
tation of the fair value have to be disclosed (FAS 123.47). Moreover,
entities that apply the "intrinsic value" approach have to display a
"pro forma net income" as well as "pro forma earnings per share" in
the notes which has to be calculated as if the company had applied the
"intrinsic value" method (FAS 123.45). While these additional disclo-
sures are required in annual statements, they have not to be included
in quarterly reports (10-Q forms).
To sum up, a major "advantage" of stock option plans may be found
in the fact that companies do not have to recognize part of employee
14
compensation cost if they follow APB 25. However, if investors pay
attention to the additional disclosures required in annual statements
the company could not hide costs by following APB 25. Nevertheless, if
a company follows FAS 123 compensation cost of stock options would
also show up in quarterly reports. Thus following APB 25 companies
are able to retain this information during the year. This is certainly
not appreciated by investors, especially if the hidden cost component
reaches economically signicant amounts. Therefore, we would expect
that companies follow the fair value approach of FAS 123 in order
to avoid being suspected of hiding some part of compensation cost.
However, this is not the case as we will see later.
3 Accruals of compensation cost
Before we evaluate the magnitude of hidden compensation cost in the
next section, this section provides a detailed description of how com-
pensation costs should be accrued under FAS 123. Investors may wish
to know how much future earnings are aected by a particular option
grant. Therefore, in the rst example we analyze how much a one-
time grant may cost in subsequent periods. Since this depends on the
vesting schedule, two alternative vesting schedules are analyzed: cli
15
and graded vesting. However, one-time grants are the exception rather
than the rule. Therefore, a second example demonstrates the calcula-
tion of total compensation cost in a particular period accounting for
grants given in previous years. For simplicity, we assume in all the
examples that options are granted at the end of a nancial year.
Table 1 displays the percentage of options that get vested each period
for two dierent vesting schemes. If cli vesting is prevalent all of the
options which are granted at a particular occasion vest at the same
time, say after 4 years of service. Assuming a forfeiture rate of 5% per
annum, at the end of the four-year service period (1   :05)
4
= 81:5%
of the initially granted options are expected to get vested. Thus, :815
times the number of options granted, N , times the fair value of one
option, C, gives the total value of the award. Since consideration has
to be distributed ratably over the service period, the compensation
cost to be recognized during each year has to be calculated on the
basis of :815=4 = 20:4% of the initially granted options. This is the
basis for compensation cost of each period. The annual cost would be
:204N C. The example is illustrated in gure 1 in the appendix.
With a graded vesting scheme options are vested in certain install-
ments. For example, 25% of the initially granted options get vested
at the end of each year. Again, we assume a forfeiture rate of 5% per
16
annum. Since employees who leave the company after one year of ser-
vice have already received the rst year's installment more options are
expected to vest than in the case of cli vesting. Compensation cost is
calculated as if a series of cli vesting awards was given rather than a
single award. The rst year's installment has to be fully accrued in this
period, and on top of that half of the second year's installment, one
third of the third, and so on. Thus, :25(1+1=2+1=3+1=4) = 47:3% of
the options is the basis for cost accrual in the rst year. With graded
vesting the basis for compensation cost accruals is higher in earlier
periods than in later periods. The example is illustrated in gure 2 in
the appendix.
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Financial year 01 02 03 04 Total
(A) Cli vesting
Options vested 81.5% 81.5%
recognized 20.4% 20.4% 20.4% 20.4% 81.5%
(B) Graded vesting
Options vested 23.8% 22.6% 21.4% 20.4% 88.1%
recognized 47.3% 23.5% 12.2% 5.1% 88.1%
Table 1: Comparison of cli and graded vesting. For each vesting schedule
the percentage of options vested in a given year as well as the percentage of
compensation cost recognized is given. We assume that option are granted at
the end of year 00 with a service period of 4 years. While in the case of cli
vesting all of the options get vested after 4 years, i.e. at the end of year 04, in
the case of graded vesting we assume that in each year of service 25% of the
options get vested. Moreover we assume, that each year 5% of the options are
forfeited due to usual uctuation of employees.
Assume that 10,000 options were granted at the end of year 00. In
order to calculate the fair value of the award, assume that the strike
price was chosen to be equal to the stock price at grant, say $100.
Furthermore, let the expected volatility be 30% p.a., the appropriate
interest rate 6%, and the dividend yield 0%. If we assume that all
options are exercised as soon as they get vested, we would estimate
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that the expected life of the option is 4 years. Using the Black-Scholes
model to calculate the fair value of one call we arrive at $26.38. If
we stick to the assumption that all options are exercised as soon as
they get vested, the expected life of an option given under the graded
vesting scheme is 2.5 years, and the resulting fair value is $21.09. Note
that the assumptions underlying the computation of Black-Scholes
values are rather modest. Some of the companies in our study use
annual volatilities above 60% or expected lives of 5 years and longer
in order to compute pro forma net income.
Expected life Accrued compensation cost in year Total
of an option 01 02 03 04 cost
(A) Cli vesting 4.0 53,713 53,713 53,713 53,713 214,852
(B) Graded vesting 4.0 124,681 62,033 32,275 13,428 232,417
2.5 99,685 49,597 25,804 10,736 185,822
Table 2: Accrued compensation cost of awards (in $) over the service period under cli and
graded vesting schedules. The example presumes that 10,000 options are granted at the end
of nancial year 00. In order to calculate Black-Scholes values we assume that the strike price
is xed at the stock price at grant, i.e. $100. Furthermore, an expected volatility of 30% p.a.,
an interest rate of 6%, and a dividend yield of 0% is assumed. With an expected life of 4
and 1.51 years the resulting fair value of one option at the grant date is $26.38 and $21.09,
respectively.
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As already mentioned, the NCEO nds that most of the companies
that use stock options provide ongoing awards. Therefore, we con-
struct an example to illustrate the hit to earnings with repeated annual
grants. Note that we use quite modest assumptions. In particular, we
assume that a company grants options in the amount of 1% of already
outstanding shares.
13
Say that 1 million shares are outstanding at the
end of nancial year 00. In order to mimic the stock market behavior
of recent years, we let stock prices appreciate annually by 12%. Ev-
erything else unchanged, this induces that the Black-Scholes value for
newly granted options increases by the same percentage gure making
a grant of a xed number of options each year more and more costly.
Compensation cost is distributed ratably over the presumed vesting
period of 4 years. Table 3 displays results for a cli vesting schedule.
For the computation of Black-Scholes values the same assumptions are
used as in table 2.
13
Cisco Systems, for example, has got shareholder approval to provide annual grants of up to
4.75% of outstanding shares.
20
Fin. Stock Fair Options Accrued compensation cost in nancial year
year price value granted 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
01 100.00 26.38 10.0 53.7 53.7 53.7 53.7
02 112.00 29.54 10.1 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6
03 125.44 33.09 10.2 68.5 68.5 68.5 68.5
04 140.49 37.06 10.2 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3
05 157.35 41.51 10.3 87.2 87.2 87.2 87.2
06 176.23 46.49 10.4 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5
07 197.38 52.07 10.5 111.2 111.2 111.2 111.2
08 221.07 58.31 10.6 125.5 125.5 125.5
09 247.60 65.31 10.7 141.7 141.7
10 277.31 73.15 10.7 160.0
Total compensation cost over all awards: 260.1 293.6 331.5 374.2 422.4 476.9 538.4
Table 3: Accrued compensation cost with revolving options awards under a cli vesting schedule.
4 The quality of reported earnings
In order to investigate whether stock option compensation cost is neg-
ligible we analyze income statements of 20 S&P 500 companies. These
companies are selected on the basis of a recent UBS-Warburg study
14
which investigates the intrinsic value of currently outstanding options
of all S&P 500 companies. We restrict our analysis to the 20 compa-
nies which have the highest ratio of total outstanding options to total
outstanding shares. Rather than looking at the intrinsic value of op-




available 10-K forms led with the SEC. Interestingly, none of the 20
companies in our study follows FAS 123.
Table 4 displays a company's net income as stated, i.e. accounting for
stock-based compensation according to APB 25, as well as pro forma
income complient with FAS 123. Let us have a closer look at Yahoo.
The total Black-Scholes value of all options granted during nancial
year 1999 was $1,563 million (last column). If all the company's stock
option plans would follow the same vesting schedule, say cli vest-
ing with a service period of 4 years, then compensation cost of $390
million should have been recognized. Unfortunately, the company has
implemented dierent vesting schedules and it does not disclose how
many options are granted under each schedule. Therefore, it is not
possible for an investor to verify the income reduction from the dis-
closures made in the 10-K form. Note that the 1999 dierence of pro
forma income and income as stated ($317 million including tax eects)
is largely due to options grants given in 1999. The total Black-Scholes
value of stock option granted in nancial years 1999, 1998, and 1997
amounts to million $1,563, $643 and $89, respectively.
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Company Name Ratio of Net Pro Reduction Options granted
total income forma of in FY 1999
outst. as net stated No. Black Value of
options stated income net of Scholes total
to income options value award
shares (mill. $) (mill. $) (mill.) ($) (mill. $)
Siebel Systems 45% 122 95 22% 27 20.86 553
Young & Rubicam 34% 167 159 5% 4 12.30 54
Delta Air Lines 33% 1,101 935 15% 20 16.00 314
Maxim Integrated 30% 196 158 19% 8 19.21 149
Broadcom 28% 83 -106 227% 23 31.35 722
Cendant 25% -55 -213 287% 30 18.10 543
Merrill Lynch 24% 2,618 2,326 11% 30 24.78 742
Yahoo 23% 61 -256 519% 37 41.77 1,563
Citrix Systems 23% 117 64 45% 21 14.37 304
Sapient 22% 30 -10 132% 4 21.62 97
Paine Webber Group 21% 629 593 6% 4 13.64 49
PeopleSoft 20% -178 -263 48% 30 6.61 196
T.R. Price 20% 239 219 8% 3 9.86 34
Qualcomm Inc. 19% 201 149 26% 5 28.56 135
Capital One Fin. 19% 363 326 10% 11 25.92 273
Lehman Bros. 18% 1,132 1,091 4% 11 13.98 148
America Online 18% 762 504 34% 55 22.93 1,256
Hasbro Inc. 18% 189 171 10% 7 12.13 87
Toys 'R' Us 18% 279 232 17% 40 6.26 249
J.P. Morgan 17% 2,055 1,962 5% 6 37.70 239
Table 4: Cost of stock-based compensation of 20 S&P 500 companies that rely heavily on stock option
plans. The rst column displays the ratio of total outstanding shares to total outstanding options,
including non-vested options. Then, net income as stated and pro forma income complient with FAS
123 are given, followed by the reduction of net income if companies would have applied the fair value
method of FAS 123. The last three columns exhibit stock options granted in nancial year 1999: number
of options granted, weighted average Black-Scholes value of one option, and Black-Scholes value of the
total award.
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The mean reduction in net income for all 20 companies computes
to a stunning value of 67.8 %, the median is 18.1 %. A net income
reduction below 5% is recorded only by three companies, Lehman
Bros. (3.6%), J.P. Morgan (4.5%), and Young & Rubicam (4.97%). All
other companies exceed the usual immateriality limit. While the next
9 companies would experience an earnings hit between 5 and 25%, the
remaining 8 companies would experience a reduction of net income
by more than 25% if they would apply FAS 123. Two companies,
i.e. Broadcom and Yahoo, should have reported a net loss rather than
a net income. Looking at how much value is handed over to employees
by companies like Yahoo, Cendant, or Broadcom it is hard to conclude
that these amounts are not economically signicant.
5 Conclusion
It should be noted that the rst press releases which capture the at-
tention of investors and analysts do provide considerably less detail
than the 10-K forms led with the SEC. It is rather unusual that a
company includes the number of granted options or a pro forma net
income according to FAS 123 into its press release. This is particularly
irritating since after the initial press release investors may have to wait
24
a month or two for the SEC ling of the 10-K form.
For individual investors it is tedious to obtain pro forma incomes, es-
pecially in the light that they would have to estimate quarterly pro
forma net income by themselves. However, institutional investors re-
lying on I/B/E/S earnings forecasts are not better o since I/B/E/S
does not provide forecasts of pro forma income.
Since the cost of these stock option programs can reach economically
signicant amounts it is stunning that the nancial press is so silent
about these gures while forecasts of "earnings as stated" and related
components get so much attention. If investors are able to make perfect
forecasts of the earnings reduction induced by stock option plans then
indeed this should be no subject at all. However, given the fact that
we often observe earnings surprises, i.e. forecasts of regular earnings
are often out of line with actually announced gures, it seems at least
doubtful that forecasts of net income reduction are more precise. Thus,
the question remains why do analysts focus on net income as stated
and not pro forma income. Why do we hear so little about the hit to
earnings? Are investors fully aware of this eect?
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